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I. Group Legal Services and Legal Ethics
The Chicago Motor Club, a non-profit organization of 60,000 auto-
mobile owners, provided various services for its members. It posted
traffic signs, financed a schoolboy patrol, gave touring and motor-
ing information, promoted legislation, and maintained emergency road
services. It also provided legal services. If a member was arrested for a
traffic violation, became involved in litigation concerning a traffic
accident, or needed advice about the use or ownership of his car, he
could consult a lawyer hired and paid by the Club out of Club dues.
By pooling their financial resources, members provided lawyers for
themselves in situations in which an individual member could not,
either because he could not afford a lawyer or because the claim was too
small. During one year (1931), the legal service handled 8,640 cases
involving property damage caused by cars. The average amount per
claim was $12.39.1
The Chicago Bar Association claimed that the Club's service was
unethical and sued to enjoin it. An Illinois commissioner found that
the Club "rendered valuable services to its members and to the com-
munities in which it operates," 2 and the Illinois Supreme Court char-
acterized the Club's general activity as "beneficial." 3 But the Club was
outlawed because it engaged in the "corporate practice" of law. "When
the Chicago Motor Club offered legal services to its members ... it was
engaging in the business of hiring lawyers to practice law for its
members. ' 4 The Club was also guilty of "commercialization."
Legal services cannot be capitalized for the profit of laymen,
corporate or otherwise, directly or indirectly, in this State ...
[T]he public welfare demands that legal services should not be
t BA. 1963, Columbia University; LL.B. 1966, Yale University.
The literature in this field has become vast, and I have tried to limit the footnotes.
A bibliography of materials may be found at 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 456 (1965). See also the
articles and notes in 41 Notre Dame Law. 843-905, 927-81 (1966), and authorities cited
therein.
1. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 111. 50, 55, 199 N.E. 1,
3 (1935).
2. Id. at 52, 199 N.E. at 2.
3. Id. at 56, 199 N.E. at 3.
4. Id. at 56-57, 199 N.E. at 4.
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commercialized, and that no corporation, association or partner-
ship of laymen can contract with its members to supply them with
legal services, as if that service were a commodity which could be
advertised, bought, sold and delivered.0
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen had a different idea about
how to provide legal assistance for its members. Instead of hiring its
own lawyers, it recommended a selected group of lawyers, screened for
their competence and honesty, to all injured Brothers.0 Because the
lawyers could expect a continuing stream of cases, they were willing to
charge lower contingent rates and also to contribute part of their fees
to the Legal Aid Bureau of the Brotherhood. The Legal Aid Bureau
investigated all accidents, informed injured workmen about the pro-
gram, tried to convince them to see the recommended lawyers, and
generally advertised the legal service to the Brothers. Through this plan,
the Brotherhood insured to its members relatively cheap7 and effective
legal assistance.
The Brotherhood had an obvious interest in the plan. It had been
the moving force behind the passage of the Federal Employers Liability
Act and the Safety Appliance Act and did not want the benefits
obtained for the members in Congress to be eroded in court.8 An Ohio
court, scrutinizing the plan, "conceded that the object of the plan, so
far as the Brotherhood is concerned is a noble one."0 But again, as in
the Chicago Motor Club case, nobility of purpose could not save the
plan, which the court said amounted to "solicitation." The finding that
the Brotherhood solicited business for the recommended lawyers and
the conclusion of illegality were treated as equivalent.10
These two cases were decided during the 1930's. In that period group
legal services were outlawed regularly." Today there is a new effort to
establish these programs. Since the federal government has made the
fight for legal representation a battle in the War on Poverty, the Office
5. Id. at 57, 199 N.E. at 4.
6. In re Petition of the Comm. on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Assn, 15 Ohio L. Abs.
106 (Ohio App. 1933).
7. Twenty per cent contingent fee in 1933, twenty-five per cent in 1964. See Bodle,
Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 306, 311-12 (1965).
8. Id. at 306-10; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar,
377 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964).
9. In re Petition of the Comm. on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio L. Abs.
106, 107 (Ohio App. 1933).
10. Id. at 108.
11. E.g., Richmond Assn of Credit fen v. Bar Ass'n of City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327,
189 S.E. 153 (1937); In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mlass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); People
ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933).
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of Economic Opportunity has funded 170 neighborhood law programs
which will finance groups of lawyers so that they can represent the poor
without charge. Approximately 140 of these programs are already
operational. Labor unions, civil rights and civil liberties organizations,
trade associations, and the United States Army12 have similar plans.
Large segments of the bar now support these efforts, but some do not.
And these are fighting hard, with the rules of legal ethics as their
weapons. The legality of OEO's program has been challenged in at least
five cities. The program has been upheld in Philadelphia,"8 Houston14
and Modesto, California. 15 Litigation is still pending in Orlando,
Florida. 6 But in New York the program was denied a charter (with
leave to file a new application) at least in part because the proposed
program violated some of the rules of legal ethics.17
This, then, is the problem: a group of people organize to provide
cheaper or more efficient legal service for themselves or for others; no
one challenges the utility of the organization, only its legality; the
challenge may be successful because the organization has committed or
will commit an ethical sin. And the number of sins is immense:
maintenance, champerty, barratry, solicitation, inciting litigation, ad-
vertising, channeling, commercialization, corporate practice, unauthor-
ized practice, ambulance chasing, lay intermediary, control of litigation.
The idea that the old rules of legal ethics should affect contemporary
legal practice at all seems strange. So many of them emerged when the
legal profession was a small, elite, compact community. Lawyers
trained, lived, socialized, and worked together in a friendly and non-
competitive atmosphere. Many of the so-called rules of legal ethics were
really rules of etiquette designed more to keep the group congenial
than to benefit the public.' The mid-twentieth century legal profession
resembles its ancestor only in romantic fancy. Today's lawyer trains in
one of the many law schools throughout the country. His sense of com-
12. See Winkler, Legal Assistance for the Armed Forces, 50 A.B.A.J. 450 (1964).
13. In re Community Legal Services, Inc., Pa. C.P. 4, March Term, 1966, No. 4968 (85
U.S.L.W. 2017, June 80, 1966).
14. Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, No. 722538 (D. Ct. Harris County, Texas,
165th Jud. Dist., March 7, 1967).
15. Stanislaus County Bar Ass'n v. California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., No, 93802
(Dept. No. 4 Stanislaus County, California, October 12, 1966).
16. Troutman v. Shriver, Civil Action No. 66-188 (M.D. Fla.). The Florida Bar Assoda.
tion's Committee on Professional Ethics has issued an advisory opinion upholding the
proposed Tampa program. Advisory Opinion No. 66-56 (March 10, 1967). The opinion, of
course, is not binding on any court, though it may have a great influence.
17. In re Community Action For Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 854, 274 N.Y.S.2d
779 (1966). On the OEO and similar programs, see Note, Neighborhood Law Oflices: The
New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REv. 805 (1967).
18. H. DRINKER, LEGAL Ernics 210-12 (1953).
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munity with most of his fellow students must be slight. He enters a
highly competitive profession which, at least in many of its outward
manifestations, cannot be distinguished from other American busi-
nesses. But it is too simple to reject the rules of legal ethics by saying
that times have changed. If we are not willing to accept rules solely
because they have existed, neither should we reject them solely because
they are old. Some rules of legal ethics are based on wise policies which
have relevance today. Yet even these rules are so broadly and so
indiscriminately applied that they seem to outlaw as many beneficial
practices as they do harmful ones. Our task is to understand these
policies and then to fashion rules which fit the policies precisely.
Maintenance, Champerty, and Barratry
Rules prohibiting maintenance (helping another prosecute a suit),
champerty (maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the
outcome), and barratry (a continuing practice of maintenance or chain-
perty) are among the most potent rules used to outlaw group legal
services. Indeed, these rules strike at the heart of many group efforts
because the groups have as their reason for existing the desire to help
people prosecute claims which might not be prosecuted othenvise. The
policies behind the three prohibitions are similar, and they are dis-
cussed together here.
The English common law followed the Greek and Roman law in
prohibiting maintenance, champerty, and barratry. The two ancient
civilizations prevented a disinterested third party from helping liti-
gants maintain suits because the maintenance could be used to oppress
poor people or to vex political opponents. The prohibitions were not
universal, though. Generally, when one of the two parties was sub-
stantially weaker, intervention was permitted to protect him. When
the maintainer did not have the required vexing or oppressing motive,
he was not punished. Nor was he punished when his suit was successful,
even if he had the forbidden motive. The evil to be prevented was the
abuse of legal processes to oppress or annoy people who had done no
wrong. If the other party in fact had done something wrong, or if the
maintainer did not act maliciously, the process was not abused.' 0
To these reasons for prohibiting maintenance the English added
three of their own. First, maintenance was particularly obnoxious to
the King since it represented an attempt by the powerful feudal lords
19. Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALi. L. REv. 48, 48-57 (1935).
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to increase their influence by giving support to their retainers without
regard to the validity of the claim.20 Second, when a person maintained
a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome, the speculative
nature of his interest was viewed as immoral.2' Finally, when someone
maintained a suit, he stirred up litigation which might not have been
brought otherwise. And understandably, litigation, which during the
common law's infancy often consisted of trial by battle or ordeal, was
not highly thought of.2
2
None of these three additional reasons has much validity today. The
authority of the central government has been well enough established
so that it need not worry about people who maintain suits to gain
power and prestige. The attitude against speculation in general has
changed, as has the attitude against speculation in litigation. The
assignment of choses in action which fits the definition of champerty is
now a common practice. 23 Contingent fee contracts, another example of
champerty, are also increasingly being accepted. 24 The policy against
litigation, at least in its original guise,25 cannot be justified either since
trial by battle and ordeal is no longer a real threat.
There are, however, valid uses for the rules against maintenance,
champerty and barratry. These rules can be used, as they were for the
Greeks and the Romans, to prevent oppressive and vexatious litigation,
to protect harassed litigants, and to protect the integrity of the legal
process. In order to serve these functions, though, the rules must be
refashioned in terms of the motive of the maintainer and the outcome
of the litigation.
Although the development has not been constant, the trend in the
law of maintenance seems to be towards focusing more sharply upon
the real evils of vexation and oppression.2 The comprehensive scope
and application of the common law prohibitions were first limited by
allowing maintenance if the alleged maintainer had a certain kind of
20. Id. at 63-65. See also 3 W. Ho.DswoRTH, A HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 395-99 (ad ed.
1924); 8 id. at 397-402, and P. WINFIELD, TRE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND Anusa OF LEGAL
PRocEDuaE 131-60 (1921).
21. Radin, supra note 19, at 65-66.
22. Id. at 57-59.
23. Winfield, Assignments of Chases in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Cham,
erty, 35 L.Q. REv. 143, 143-62 (1919); Radin, supra note 19, at 67-68.
24. G. COSTIGAN, CASES AND OTHER AuTHoRITIES ON TlE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ITS ETHICS
643-49 (2d ed. 1933); J. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 205-10 (1916); 1-1.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETmCS 176 (1953); Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV.
587, 589 (1940); Buckley v. Service Transportation Corp., 277 App. Div. 224, 98 N.Y.U.2d
586 (1950).
25. Other reasons for rules against stirring up litigation will be discussed infra.
26. See Annot., 139 A.L.R. 620 (1942).
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relationship with the suitor, for example, landlord-tenant, master-ser-
vant, and blood relations.27 When the suitor and the maintainer were
not within the exceptions courts and legislatures began to abandon the
common law policies further by looking at the maintainer's intent,
not at a characterization of his act. In New York, for example, the
acts of maintenance must be done "with a corrupt or malicious intent
to vex and annoy."
28
The offense does not consist in promoting either private suits or
public prosecutions when the sole object is the attainment of
public justice or private right, but in the prostitution of these
remedies to mean and selfish purposes.2"
The common law dies hard, though, and the feudal attitudes about
litigation still appear. A Georgia court writing in 1935 could have easily
written its explanation of champerty centuries ago.
The exciting or stirring up of suits may be upon grounds that are
absolutely just and well founded, and yet the Penal Code properly
states that if any person makes a practice of stirring up suits or
exciting quarrels between individuals, he becomes guilty of a
misdemeanor.3 0
As long as the emphasis is on the act of maintaining a suit rather than
on its motive or effect, courts will strike indiscriminately at those legal
services which serve along with those which merely vex. This broad
prohibition is especially ironic since certain groups are prevented from
protecting the oppressed in the name of a doctrine created to prevent
oppression.31
Corporate Practice of Law
One of the easiest ways a court can outlaw group legal services is by
employing the doctrine that a corporation cannot practice law. Many
27. Id. at 636-40.
28. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 322, cited in People v. Budner, 13 App. Div. 253, 256, 215 N.YS.2d
791, 794 (1961).
29. 9 CJ.S. Barratry § 2, at 1547, cited in People v. Budner, 13 App. Div. -53, 256, 215
N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (1961). See also Commonwealth v. M'Culloch, 15 Mass. 277 (1818); Golden
Commissary Corp. v. Shipley, 157 A.2d 810, 815 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1960).
30. Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 65, 185 S.E. 181, 133 (1935). The court's attempt to
blame the anachronism on the legislature was a ruse since the Code made only inciting
"unjust and vexatious suits" a misdemeanor. GA. CODE AN. § 26-7410. See also Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Andrews, 338 Il1. App. 552, 88 N.E.2d 364 (1949) (there were serious ques-
tions in this case about the attorney's competence and about his overbearing the prospec-
tive client, but the court concentrated mainly on the stirring up of litigation without
looking at the merits of the suit or the maintainer's motive); Ackerman v. State, 124 Tex.
Crim. 125, 61 sAV.2d 116 (1933).
31. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti.NAACP Laws, 12 IV. PoL Q. 371,
374-76 (1959); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (concurring opinion of Douglas,
J.); Reference, Inciting Litigation, 3 RAcE RE. L. RE. 1057, 1263-66 (1958).
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group legal services are incorporated and clearly fall within the pro-
scription. The process of decision usually takes the form of a simple
syllogism. A corporation cannot practice law. This association (union,
club) is a corporation which practices law (provides, recommends, or
pays lawyers). Therefore, the association's activities are illegal.82 But
courts rarely tell us why corporations cannot practice law; the reasons
they give, as one commentator quaintly remarked, are no more than
"hocus pocus."33
For example:
The practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal
right, limited to a few persons of good moral character, with special
qualifications ascertained and certified after a long course of study,
both general and professional, and a thorough examination by a
state board appointed for the purpose. The right to practice law is
in the nature of a franchise from the state conferred only for merit.
It cannot be assigned or inherited, but must be earned by hard
study and good conduct. It is attested by a certificate of the Su-
preme Court, and is protected by registration. No one can practice
law unless he has taken an oath of office and has become an officer
of the court, subject to its discipline, liable to punishment for
contempt in violating his duties as such, and to suspension or
removal. It is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and
the rules of the courts. As these conditions cannot be performed by
a corporation, it follows that the practice of law is not a lawful
business for a corporation to engage in. As it cannot practice law
directly, it cannot indirectly by employing competent lawyers to
practice for it, as that would be an evasion which the law will not
tolerate.34
Or:
The practice of the law is personal. It is open only to individuals
proved to the satisfaction of the court to possess sufficient general
knowledge and adequate special qualifications as to learning in the
law and to be of good moral character. After one has been sanc-
tioned in these respects, the oath as an attorney must be taken,
whereby one becomes an officer of the court and subject to its
discipline for violation of his obligations even to the extent of
removal from his office. A dual trust is imposed on attorneys at
law: they must act with all good fidelity both to the courts and to
their clients. They are bound by canons of ethics which have been
32. See, e.g., Doughty v. Grills, 371 Tenn. App. 63, 94, 260 S.W.2d 379, 392 (1952).
33. Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law-A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD.
L. REv. 342 (1938).
34. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910).
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the growth of long experience and which are enforced by the courts.
. . . The relation of an attorney to his client is preeminently
confidential. In addition to adequate learning, it demands on the
part of the attorney undivided allegiance, a conspicuous degree of
faithfulness and disinterestedness, absolute integrity, and utter
renunciation of every personal advantage conflicting in any way
directly or indirectly with the interests of his client. Only a human
being can conform to these exacting requirements. Artificial crea-
tions such as corporations or associations cannot meet these pre-
requisites 5
It is true, of course, that a corporation cannot take an oath and has
no human qualities. It does not follow that the lawyers employed
by the corporation are equally disabled. Whatever education or ethical
standards must be enforced can be enforced against the individual
lawyers. Nor is it clear why the court cannot discipline the lawyers or
even the laymen who own or direct the corporation if it engages in
unethical conduct. These answers are becoming increasingly acceptable
to some who had opposed corporate practice, especially since the tax
benefits of incorporating have become manifest.30 However, in spite of
the growing recognition that it makes no sense to prohibit a group of
people from practicing law simply because it is incorporated, there
are still attempts to outlaw group legal services for that reason. 7
Other concerns which are related to, but do not necessarily depend
upon, the corporate form of the organization are more plausible. For
example, there is the fear that an organized group which provides legal
services might interfere with the attorney-client relationship,38 or at-
tempt to control the lawyer in some way harmful to the client.30 Or,
even if the organization does not consciously do either of these things,
there is the possibility that the mere existence of the organization will
force the lawyer to divide his loyalties between the client and the
organization.40 These fears are legitimate because we are, or should be,
concerned that the lawyer perform the most effective possible service
35. In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 613, 194 N.E. 313, 316-17 (1935).
36. See In re The Florida Bar, 13 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961); Bye and Young, Law Firm
Incorporation in Colorado, 34 Rocky MT. L. Rxv. 427 (1962).
57. See Brief for the ABA as Amicus Curiae at 17, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); State Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234-36, 140 A.2d 863, 870-71 (1958).
88. See, e.g., People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 111. 102,
109, 187 N.E. 823, 826 (1983).
89. See, e.g., Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of City of Richmond, 167 Va.
827, 339, 189 S.E. 153, 159 (1987); Canon of Professional Ethics 35.
40. See, e.g., In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483-84, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910),
and ABA, Information Opinion of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law,
86 A.BA.J. 677 (1950).
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for his client. An organization which can exert pressure on the lawyer
or which interferes with the direct communication between attorney
and client can direct the lawyer's major concern away from his client.
There would be little quarrel with the courts or the bar associations
if they punished those group legal efforts which have sacrificed their
clients' interests. However, those who have opposed group legal services
seem to have assumed that all control by an organization of its lawyers
interferes with the attorney-client relationship, that all interferences
hurt the client, that the possibility of conflict exists equally in all group
services, and finally that the mere possibility of conflict has, in fact, or
will, in fact, cause the individual lawyer to sacrifice his client's interest.
If rules of legal ethics are justified ultimately because they protect the
client's interest, then there should be a sharp focus on exactly how and
when the client is hurt. The quarrel, then, is not with the policies
behind prohibition of corporate practice, but with their indiscriminate
application.
For example, the very general fear that an organization will interfere
with the attorney-client relationship often obscures discussion of when
the relationship exists and when it is really necessary. Undoubtedly, a
close and constant communication between the attorney and the client
helps the lawyer serve his client best in most cases. However, many
group legal services maintain a strict attorney-client relationship. The
lawyer recommended by the BRT is in constant contact with the in-
jured workman, as is the NAACP lawyer with his client. The attorney
and client communicate directly, not through the organization which
brought them together.
There are some plans, though, in which the organization does act as
an intermediary. In those cases the courts should be especially careful
that the intermediary does not prevent adequate communication. But,
again, increased care does not necessitate a blanket disapproval of all
group intermediaries. In some situations, direct communication is less
necessary than in others. The Illinois Association of Real Estate Tax-
payers was organized specifically to challenge the legality of Illinois
property taxes. Members authorized the Association to prosecute suits
in their behalf for this purpose.41 At times they were made plaintiffs
without further consultation. It is not clear why a strict attorney-client
relationship was necessary here. Presumably each member's interest in
the litigation coincided with the interest of the others. The Associa-
41. People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 825
(1933).
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tion's goals were well publicized, and an individual with interests dif-
ferent from the Association's would not have joined.4
The same lack of concern about the client's interest is evident when
the bar associations and the courts talk about group "control" over
lawyers without distinguishing among kinds and degrees of control.
Two courts have prohibited the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
which solicits FELA cases for a limited number of approved attorneys,
from fixing the rate which the lawyer can charge and from requiring
the attorneys to pay for the cost of the solicitation service.43 The
Brotherhood did not attempt to control the attorneys in any other way.
They were free to consult with the injured trainmen and conduct the
litigation or settlement free from restraint. Although the financial
arrangement was determined by the organization, the strategy of litiga-
tion was determined by the attorney and client. The only kind of
control exerted by the Brotherhood seemed to benefit its members since
it provided cheaper, more efficient service.44 Yet the practice was out-
lawed, because "control" was bad.
Finally, and most importantly, arguments about "conflict of interest"
illustrate the tendency to infer harm from the possibility that it might
occur. The fear that the existence of an organization will divide the
lawyer's loyalty between the organization and the client rests on many
uncritical assumptions; for example, that the interests of the client
and the interests of the organization necessarily conflict. Some organiza-
tions have no institutional interest at all which could conflict with the
individual litigant's interest.45 The Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men's stated purpose is to enforce the FELA so that the Brothers will
receive ample compensation for their injuries. This purpose coincides
exactly with the trainman's interest. If the BRT expanded its program
and recommended estate and divorce lawyers, or if it hired its own
lawyers to provide these services, there would be an even smaller pos-
sibility of conflict. There are organizations, of course, which do have
very strong institutional interests, organizations with a cause-the
42. The Association was outlawed, nonetheless, and partly because there was no attor-
ney-client relationship. 354 111. 102, 109, 187 N.E. 823, 826 (1933).
43. In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 IMI. 2d 391, 398, 150 N.E.2d 163, 167
(1958); In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
44. There are other ways in which control by the organization may benefit the client.
For example, one usual check on the quality of a lawyer's work is the client himself. Since
the clients of many group legal services will not be paying, the effectiveness of that check
might be diminished. The organization itself must then take over the job of controlling
the quality of the work.
45. See Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the
Services of Attorneys, 72 HA.v. L. REv. 1334, 1339 (1959).
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NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the Association of Real Estate Taxpayers,
etc. 40 However, these organizations usually publicize their goals widely,
and individuals who use their legal services often do so because their
interests coincide.
Sometimes this answer will not be satisfactory. If the BRT decides
that it must establish a precedent, then its interest in that precedent
might conflict with the Brother's interest in recovery. Or, if the Legal
Defense Fund defends a Negro convicted of rape and sentenced to
death in order to assert that Negroes are denied equal protection in
sentencing, the organization's interest in the equal protection claim
and the defendant's interest obviously do not coincide completely. The
defendant would as soon have his conviction reversed because of an
illegal search and seizure, or because the elements of the crime were
not proven. However, the possibility that the Legal Defense Fund's
institutional interest might conflict with the client's interest does not
mean that the Defense Fund lawyer allows the conflict to affect his
action.47 In fact, even a casual reading of the Defense Fund's briefs in
its rape cases, and in many other cases where the possibility of conflict
exists, will prove that clients are not sacrificed for the sake of legal
arguments. There may be organizations which do indulge and lawyers
whose zeal for a principle outweighs the client's interest, but these cases
should be dealt with on an individual basis.
In the cases of gross abuse it will be quite easy to tell when the lawyer
subverts his client's interest. But more subtle abuse is also possible. It
is this possibility which may force the courts to look for the causes of
the harm rather than for the harm itself. From the existence of certain
specific practices, the court would predict that the client's interest
might be ignored. For example, the fact that the BRT set the price of
its lawyers would indicate that it might exercise control over those
lawyers to the detriment of the Brothers. If an organization pre-
vented direct communication between lawyer and client, a court might
see a potential injury to the client even if no particular interference
proved harmful. If the interests of the organization and the client
did not coincide completely, the court might predict that sometime in
the future the lawyer would choose to act in the organization's interest
rather than in the client's.
46. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 462-63 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Harlan, 1.).
47. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, recognized that
the existence of a conflict does not necessarily induce the lawyer to misconduct. "jTlhe
lawyer necessarily finds himself with a divided allegiance-to his employer and to Ills clients
-which may prevent full compliance with his basic professional obligations." Id. at 460
(emphasis added).
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These predictions, though, seem to contradict assumptions which
form the foundations of the legal profession. Generally, we assume that
a lawyer is an advocate, serving no interest but his client's. If a lawyer
in a law firm is defending an antitrust suit for a small client, we do not
normally suspect that he is subverting this client's interest in order to
create a precedent favorable to the firm's bigger clients. If an inde-
pendent lawyer is a member of SNOC, or believes in its goals, or
perhaps even is paid to do some of its tax work, we do not think that in
defending a Negro in an assigned criminal case he will press SNCC's
favorite legal theories rather than the ones most beneficial to his client.
So far these assumptions about the lawyer's sense of responsibility
have worked reasonably well. When they don't, dissatisfied clients may
provide a means for detection. There is no reason to make different
assumptions about lawyers working for group legal services or to think
that a group legal service which habitually sacrifices its clients' interests
will not soon be found out.
Advertising and Solicitation
The proscriptions against advertising and solicitation 8 were among
those rules of etiquette so important to the early legal profession. 40
Lawyers working closely together in a communal atmosphere would
seem unduly competitive and ungentlemanly if they advertised or
solicited business. The need for these social rules has diminished
because the legal profession has changed so much. However, other,
more modem justifications have been advanced. The claim has been
that solicitation and advertising are equivalent to "ambulance chas-
ing,"a5 that they stir up litigation,5' and that they commercialize the
profession. -52
The spectre of ambulance chasing makes rational discussion of
advertising and solicitation difficult. The injured pedestrian is rushed
to the hospital, followed by the eager (and, we assume, incompetent)
lawyer, or his agent, pen in hand, contract in pocket, ready to make the
kill. The lawyer oozes his way into the hospital room, interrupts the
grieving family, and fast-talks the broken man into signing a 60 per
cent contingent fee contract. A slight change alters the picture con-
48. See, e.g., Canons 27,28,40, 43, 46.
49. H. Dpmr'KE, LEGAL ETHICS 210-12 (1953).
50. See, e.g., In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 190, 196 N.E.2d 301. 303 (1957); Doughty v.
Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 82, 260 S.W.2d 379, 387 (1952).
51. See, e.g., Canon 28 and In re Weitz, 11 App. Div. 76,202 N.YS.,.d 393 (1950).
52. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, No. 8,
at 71, 75 (1925).
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siderably. After the trainman is injured on his job, his shop steward
informs the Legal Aid Bureau of the BRT. The Legal Aid representa-
tive rushes to the hospital and into the injured trainman's room. (He
has barely beaten the railroad's claim adjuster to the door.53) The
Legal Aid representative informs the injured workman that the
Brotherhood has arranged for highly competent and successful lawyers
to represent all injured workmen at a substantially reduced price. The
Brotherhood will also help investigate the case in preparation for
possible litigation. The injured workman agrees to employ the lawyer
suggested by the Brotherhood and signs a contract to that effect.
The scenes may be caricatures, but the lesson remains nonetheless.
Not all "ambulance chasing" is the same, and there is no good reason to
lump all solicitation or advertising together under the same label. The
first lawyer has abused the client, while the second has provided him
with a useful service. Lawyers should be condemned only if they
overbear their clients for the purpose of forcing upon them unneeded,
incompetent, or overpriced legal services.5 4
In most group legal services cases no distinction has been made
among kinds of ambulance chasing. The Illinois Supreme Court recog-
nized that the BRT's program of solicitation protected Brothers
against an aggressive railroad claims policy." Nonetheless, the court
enjoined the Brotherhood's agents from carrying contracts to the in-
jured workmen.56 Using the same "ambulance chasing" rationale,
other courts have been even more severe, enjoining the entire soliciting
arrangement.5 7 A few judges have not viewed all solicitations alike,
but those judges have been a minority.58
The second claim, that solicitation and advertising incite litigation,
53. See In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 396, 150 N.E.2d 163,
166 (1958); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,
3-5 (1964).
54. This approach was taken in Chreste v. Louisville Ry., 167 Ky. 75, 81, 180 S.W. 49,
53 (1915), and is suggested in the Brief of the ABA as Amicus Curiae, at 12. Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
55. In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 396, 150 N.E.2d 163, 166
(1958).
56. Id. at 398, 150 N.E.2d at 167.
57. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960); Hulse v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 340 S.V.2d 404 (Mo. 1960). For a longer discussion of
the Brotherhood's "ambulance chasing," see Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 82-90,
260 S.W.2d 379, 387-90 (1952).
58. See, e.g., Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932); Hildebrand v. State
Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 515, 521, 225 P.2d 508, 514, 518 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Carter and
Traynor, JJ.). Mr. Justice Black's statement in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia ex rel. Va. State Bar that ,the BRT's activity was not "ambulance chasing" may force
the majority into viewing "ambulance chasing" in a more discriminating way, but the effect
of his language is not yet dear.
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is probably justified. If lawyers use these techniques, not only will they
be making themselves more easily available, but indirectly they will be
educating people about their legal rights. Therefore, it is likely that
more suits will be brought. However, why should an increase in
litigation be considered bad? There was a time when litigation could
be considered an evil in itself, but these reasons no longer exist.
Perhaps there is a feeling that a litigious society would simply be an
unpleasant society in which to live. This vague feeling of uneasiness
does not seem an adequate foundation upon which to build a rule
against stirring up litigation. Perhaps there is a feeling, too, that courts
are burdened enough without having more suits stirred up. However, a
rule against stirring up litigation is an unsatisfactory way of deciding
which claims will and which claims will not be heard. The rule does
not screen out certain categories of claims or claims with dubious
merit. It screens out certain kinds of people-those who are too
ignorant to know when they have a legal claim and those who are
too poor to be able to afford a lawsuit. Others in our society need not
depend upon groups or individual lawyers who solicit business and
advertise their wares.
Some judges and commentators have seen solicitation as an evil
particular to certain kinds of litigation. There has been a special bias
against lawyers who solicit divorce cases since there is a strong public
policy against divorce in most states.'; Conversely, lawyers who solicit
and stir up certain kinds of favored litigation have been exempt from
ethical stigma. When an Atlanta finance corporation attacked the
Atlanta Bar Association for advertising and soliciting claims against
allegedly usurious finance companies, the Georgia court "commended
rather than condemned" the Bar Association for its ostensibly unethical
conduct.60 Even the American Bar Association recognized that the
American Liberty League's solicitation of suits challenging New Deal
legislation was "wholesome and beneficial" because the suits presented
constitutional issues.61 If a court could articulate some reason why a
particular kind of litigation should not be encouraged, then perhaps it
would be legitimate to outlaw soliciting that kind of litigation. For
example, a court might claim that the mere threat of divorce actions
destroys marriages. There might then be a legitimate interest in not
59. See Annot., Encouraging Divorce Litigation as a Grounds for Disbarment or Sus-
pension, 9 A.L.R. 1500 (1920); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation
by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 674, 678 (1958).
60. Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 381, 12 S.E.2d 602,610 (1940).
61. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMIT rEE ON PROFESSI ONAL ETIUCS AND GIIEVANcEs, No.
148, at 308, 311 (1935).
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having lawyers explain the divorce laws to quarreling couples. If the
court felt that too many stockholders' derivative suits were hold-ups,
it might then be legitimate to outlaw solicitation of these suits.
However, even in these cases the argument for preventing solicita-
tion is dubious. First, there would have to be very good evidence that
the evil effects of solicitation really would occur. And second, outlawing
solicitation might be too drastic a solution. For example, in the case of
stockholders' derivative suits, perhaps it might solve the problem of
phony claims if a bond were required from the stockholders before suit.
The third major argument against solicitation and advertising, the
commercialization claim, is the hardest to attack because it is the most
deeply ingrained in the lawyer's feeling of dignity and self-importance.
"The essential dignity of the profession forbids a lawyer to solicit
business or exploit his professional services." 2 The argument goes
further, of course, since even lawyers recognize that their dignity is of
little concern unless its absence affects the quality of justice.
. . . [F]urnishing, selling or exploiting . . . the legal services of
members of the Bar is derogatory to the dignity and self-respect of
the profession, tends to lower the standards of professional char-
acter and conduct and thus lessens the usefulness of the profession
to the public....
The italicized portion of the preceding statement is the essential part
of the commercialization claim. Unfortunately, some courts and lawyers
make the claim-"The degradation of the bar is an injury to the
state"64-on faith alone. This easy equation of the bar's interest and
the public's interest must be challenged. In a generally commercialized
society, why is there the assumption that the public will look askance at
lawyers who employ commercial techniques? And why is it so con.
fidently assumed that a legal profession ill-respected by some cannot
perform its function adequately? The legal profession is already highly
commercialized 65 and ill-respected by some, 0 and yet it seems to be
doing its job.
7
Nonetheless, there may still be circumstances in which these ques-
62. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, No. 8,
at 71, 75 (1925).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 484, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910).
65. Q. JOHNSTONE 9- D. HOIPSON, LAWYERS AND THOmR WORK 199-271 (1967).
66. See, e.g., Blaustein, What Do Laymen Think of Lawyers? Polls Show the Need for
Better Public Relations, 38 A.BA.J. 39 (1952).
67. See Riesman's suggestion that a certain amount of public disrespect for lawyers IS
perfectly tolerable. Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U. Cu1. L.
Rry. 30, 34 (1951).
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dons can be answered to support the assumptions of those who would
outlaw group legal services because of their commercial techniques.
Some kinds of gaudy and inflated advertising which would lower the
dignity of the bar might also mislead the public. Perhaps these should
be prohibited. But in the context of outlaving group legal services
the whole argument about commercialization seems quite false. If the
reputation of the bar is really important, then lawyers should at least
recognize the possibility that outlawing group legal services would
hurt their reputation more than upholding the non-commercial image
would help it, especially since it is possible for the public to view the
fight against group legal services as nothing more than an organized
monopoly's attempt to maintain its financial position. This view would
not be completely unwarranted. The entire war against the typical
unauthorized practitioner (title insurance companies, trust companies,
accountants, etc.), waged in terms of "commercialization," has many of
the elements of economic groups fighting over markets,08 complete with
market treaties69 and market compromises.7"
Suspicion of the bar's motives becomes even stronger when the groups
which are being outlawed apparently satisfy "an unfulfilled public need
for legal services," 71 and at a cheaper price. Thirty years ago WVeihofen
asked,
Why is it that individuals may band together, to provide them-
selves with cheaper insurance, cheaper groceries, higher wages,
better prices, easier credit, lower taxes, better health,-everything,
except better or cheaper legal advice and aid?72
It is hard to imagine a plausible answer unless it is in terms of pre-
serving the bar's economic monopoly, an answer repugnant to the very
principle for which the bar is supposedly fighting-the maintenance
of a profession, not a business.73
68. See Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power
Groups, 4 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1955).
69. 3 ,1ARTINDAIE-HUBBELL Law DnECroRY 197A-211A (1967).
70. See, e.g., Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); State Bar Ass'n of
Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958). The best article
on the bar's trouble in this regard remains Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices-
and Cures?, 5 LAw AND Co ¢rip. PRoB. 104 (1938).
71. Progress Report of the Committee on Group Legal Services, 39 Cal. S.B.J. 639, 652-59
(1964). See also WAr, LAw AND PovFRar (prepared as a working paper for the National
Conference on Law and Poverty, 1965); In re community Legal Services, Inc., Pa. C.P.
29-33, March Term, 1965, No. 4968 (35 U.SL.WV. 2017, June 80, 1966) and materials cited
therein.
72. Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2
U. Cm. L. REv. 119, 128 (1934).
73. See also H. DmNqm, LEGAL Ermics 167 (1953); Drinker, The Ethical Lawyer,
7 U. FL.L L. REv. 375, 382 (1954).
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None of the arguments advanced here depends upon whether the
group legal service is profit-making or non-profit-making. Either kind
of organization may provide beneficial services, and either kind may
abuse the client. In both cases the test of the organization's acceptability
should be the benefit to the public in terms of price, effectiveness, and
competence of the legal service. For example, even if the BRT were a
profit-making organization because it received payments from its
recommended lawyers,74 the service it provided was still cheaper and
more effective than the individual member could have obtained for
himself. Otherwise, at least without a showing of coercion, we may
assume the Brother would have gone elsewhere with his business.
Some Suggestions and Some Problems
Although the rules of legal ethics are too broad and indiscriminate,
they do embody several important and viable policies. A reformulation
is necessary, though, in order to insure that the new rules do not go
beyond the policies they are designed to implement. Writing new rules
will be difficult, but the previous discussion indicates some general
directions.
(1) The state should be allowed to make sure that its judicial ma-
chinery is not being used simply for harassment. The rules should be
framed to preclude the possibility that the mere tendency to harass will
be outlawed. Actual harassment, as well as intent to harass, should be
required. If the party accused of harassing wins his claim, the accusation
should fail. So, too, should it fail if the party has what seems to be a
viable claim, even if he ultimately loses or settles it.
(2) Lawyers should be punished for sacrificing clients' interests to
the interests of an organization. Here again, the mere possibility of
conflict should not be enough. Regardless of the institutional set-up
(control over fees, rebates, interferences with the direct attorney-client
relationship) or the profit-making nature of the organization, it should
be allowed to operate until some of the evil which is feared occurs. A
specific and particular showing of harm to clients should be shown.
(3) Lawyers should be prevented from taking advantage of injured
men in order to charge too much or force unneeded or unwanted legal
services upon them. Objective criteria for prices are necessary to apply
this rule. A simple method of insuring that lawyers do not take ad-
vantage of the injured man would be to keep all lawyers (or their
agents) out of hospitals or to require that someone in the family, or a
74. Cf. In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 591, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
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friend, or the doctor give permission before a lawyer could see the
patient. Once the patient is well enough to consider the lawyer's pro-
posal rationally, he can fend for himself. A court can implement these
rules by refusing to enforce the contracts until they are scrutinized
very closely.
(4) A lawyer who chases ambulances may be incompetent, and if so,
something should be done about him. However, we cannot simply
assume his incompetence. Further, the problem of qualification and
ability is -not limited to lawyers who practice for groups or lawyers
-who solicit and advertise. Whatever is to be done about incompetent
ambulance chasers must also be done to incompetent lawyers generally.
(5) If some forms of advertising are misleading or distasteful, these
can be prohibited without outlawing all attempts to make the avail-
ability of lawyers more widely known.
(6) Stirring up particular kinds of litigation may be prohibited, but
only if there are honest and well-grounded reasons to believe that there
is something in the nature of the particular litigation which gives
society an interest in preventing it. The interest must be a very
special kind, strong enough to prohibit solicitation but not strong
enough to eliminate the cause of action entirely. Divorce litigation or
litigation between members of a family might be examples. A general
feeling that too much litigation on any subject is unpleasant will not
do. Also, once the particular evil is isolated, the remedy should be
tailored to it. Solicitation should be banned only if more narrow solu-
tions fail.
These suggestions raise questions. How should harassment be de-
fined? Can a rule based on the intent to harass be enforced? Is it
possible to tell when a lawyer is sacrificing his client's interest for the
sake of the organization? Who is to determine when a lawyer is taking
advantage of his client? For example, when is the price of legal services
"too much"? And how is competent performance to be tested? The
seriousness and difficulty of these questions should not be minimized.
Indeed, it may be that we will be unable to answer them and that we
will be forced to return to broader and more indiscriminate rules.
However, the rewards of success seem great enough at least for us to
make an effort.
II. Group Legal Services and the Constitution
Pleas for reform have been heard before. The possibility that they
will be heeded, though, seems much greater now. In part this is because
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the pressure for reform has increased. But additionally, the reformers
have found a powerful, if not wholly conscious, ally in the Supreme
Court. During the last four years the Court has begun to explore the
rules of legal ethics. In two important cases the Court found certain
activities of group legal services protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and held that particular rules of legal ethics could not be
used to outlaw these practices. 75 Now the Court has agreed to review a
third case.76 Together, the three cases may provide a strong impetus
for reform.
NAACP v. Button77 was a suit by the Association to enjoin Virginia
from applying five recently passed statutes regulating the practice of
law.7 8 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Virginia
courts had declared four of the five acts unconstitutional. 79 The statute
before the Supreme Court, Chapter 33, amended the previous Vir-
ginia laws against solicitation and maintenance by increasing the cate-
gories of people who could be found guilty of the crimes. The statute
provided punishment not only for the solicitors and maintainers, but
also for any of their agents or any lawyer who took employment from
such people. Clearly the Association's activities were prohibited by the
statute. The Association's entire legal program was based on soliciting
suits through speeches, circulars, personal contacts, etc., and then main-
taining the suits by paying Association lawyers to handle them. It is
probable, though, that the Association's activities were prohibited
under the rules of the Virginia Supreme Court, which are similar to the
American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics.80 The
Association solicited business for specified lawyers; it maintained suits;
it advertised; it controlled the lawyers' fees; it was a lay intermediary;
it incited litigation; and it was a corporation practicing law. In fact, the
Virginia Supreme Court used Canons 35 and 47 as alternate grounds
for outlawing the NAACP's activities, and used as reasons for uphold-
75. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S, 1
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
76. United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 386 U.S. 941 (1967).
77. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
78. Chs. 31, 32, 33, 35, 36 [1956] Va. Acts, Ex. Sess. Originally, the Legal Defense Fund
joined the Association, but when the case finally reached the Supreme Court only the
Association was involved. The Fund's suit remained in the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.
79. See NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960). The first decision in the
proceedings, NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), declared chapters 31, 32,
and 35 unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court reversed on the procedural ground that
the Virginia courts had not had an opportunity to construe the statute. Harrison V.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). Then the case began in the Virginia courts.
80. See Rule 35, Rules for Integration of the Virginia State Bar, 171 Va, xvil, xxxii.
xxx (1938).
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ing Chapter 33 many of the policies discussed earlier.8' Thus, although
the Supreme Court had before it only the Virginia statute as amended,
the Court made it clear that what it said and what it did in Button
would affect the application of all the rules of legal ethics to group legal
services.
8 2
Deciding what the Court said and what it did in Button, though, is
not easy. Some activity of the Association was protected by the First
Amendment, and this activity was not given enough breathing space by
the Virginia statute. "[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness
are strict in the area of free expression."83 But the Court was ambigu-
ous about exactly which activity was the "constitutionally protected
activity."84 There are two candidates. The Court might have meant
that the Association's program of advising Negroes to begin litigation
was a protected activity. Then Virginia's regulation against soliciting
for Association lawyers would be unconstitutional because it was vague
enough to discourage that general advice. Or, the Court might have
meant that litigation itself was a protected activity-that any person
has the "right" to become a plaintiff in a lawsuit and that the state
could not bar an organization from helping him get into court, or at
least not in the way Virginia attempted to do so.
The first interpretation is supported by some language in the
opinion. The Court read the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation
of Chapter 33 as prohibiting a person from
[advising] another that his legal rights have been infringed and
[referring] him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys (for
example, to the Virginia Conference's legal staff) for assis-
tance .... 85
The Court then indicated that the core First Amendment right
abridged by the Virginia statute was the right to advise Negroes to
litigate, not necessarily the right to refer Negroes to particular at-
torneys.
There thus inheres in the statute the gravest danger of smothering
all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on
behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular minority.80
81. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 156-59, 116 S.E.2d 55, 66-68 (1960).
82. 371 U.S. at 429 n.11.
83. 371 U.S. at 432.
84. Id.
85. 371 U.S. at 434.
86. Id.
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However, the Association's right to refer Negroes to particular at-
torneys was upheld also, but only because denying that right would
endanger the core First Amendment right.
Lawyers on the legal staff or even mere NAACP members or
sympathizers would understandably hesitate, at an NAACP meet-
ing or on any other occasion, to do what the [Virginia] decree
purports to allow, namely, acquaint "persons with what they
believe to be their rights and... [advise] them to assert their rights
by commencing or further prosecuting a suit. . . ." For if the
lawyers, members or sympathizers also appeared in or had any
connection with any litigation supported with NAACP funds
contributed under the provision of the decree by which the
NAACP is not prohibited "from contributing money to persons
to assist them in commencing or further prosecuting such suits,"
they plainly would risk (if lawyers) disbarment proceedings and,
lawyers and non-lawyers alike, criminal prosecution for the offense
of "solicitation," to which the Virginia court gave so broad and
uncertain a meaning.
87
Although the first interpretation of Button can be supported by this
language, it is an unsatisfactory interpretation, nevertheless. The As-
sociation's right to advise litigation was guaranteed by the Virginia
court itself.88 If that were the only right involved, the Supreme Court
would not have had to go further, unless, of course, the Virginia
statute was vague enough to restrict the enjoyment of that right. The
Supreme Court did say that the statute was vague and that therefore it
might deter people from advising others to litigate. But the Court's
reasoning on this point is at least questionable.
The Court read the statute (and its gloss by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals) as punishing anyone who refers another "to a par-
ticular attorney or group of attorneys."8' s This reading makes the statute
quite broad, perhaps even broader than the Virginia courts intended,00
but broad coverage by itself does not make the statute vague. Indeed,
even under the Court's reading it seems reasonably clear what the stat-
ute would permit and what it would prohibit. A person could advise
others of their rights and advocate litigation as the means of vindicat-
ing them, as long as he did not suggest a particular lawyer or group of
lawyers to handle the litigation. It is difficult to see how this latter pro-
hibition could smother the general discussion of rights and litigation.
87. Id. at 454-35.
88. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 164, 116 S.E.2d 55, 72 (1960).
89. 371 U.S. at 434.
90. See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, 371 U.S. at 465-69.
986
Vol. 76: 966, 1967
Group Legal Services
The Court argued that lawyers, members, or sympathizers who spoke
at an NAACP meeting and who later "appeared in or had any connec-
tion with any litigation supported with NAACP funds . . . plainly
would risk (if lawyers) disbarment proceedings and, lawyers and non-
lawyers alike, criminal prosecution for the offense of 'solicitation,' to
which the Virginia court gave so broad and uncertain a meaning.""'
But if the lawyer, member, or sympathizer who spoke at the NAACP
meeting did not recommend "a particular attorney or group of attor-
neys," he would not come within the terms of the statute even as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Of course, even the most pristine
clarity does not guarantee that the state officials would not misuse the
statute in order to harass NAACP lawyers or sympathizers. That pos-
sibility raises very serious problems, but they are not problems of
vagueness.92 If it is true that there must be "an actual vagueness com-
ponent" 93 in a vagueness decision, then Mr. Justice Harlan was cor-
rect when he said that the vagueness concept "has no proper place in
this case and only serves to obscure rather than illuminate the true
questions presented."94
There is a second reason why Button should not be read as establish-
ing the right to advise others about litigation as the core First Amend-
ment right. This reading, based on the vagueness doctrine, protects
only part of the NAACP's litigation program--"advising Negroes of
their constitutional rights, urging them to institute litigation of a par-
ticular kind," and, after the First Amendment right spreads its protec-
tive umbrella, "recommending particular lawyers ... ,,0 The vague-
ness doctrine, though, has no necessary relevance to other parts of the
NAACP litigation program which the Court purported to protect-
most importantly, the Association's practice of maintaining suits by
paying its own staff of lawyers to handle them. The Court evidently
thought it was protecting the whole program, including the financial
arrangement, for it repeated several times that it was upholding the
Association's activities.90 Mr. Justice White, who concurred in the
Court's result, made explicit his understanding of what the Court held
to be constitutionally protected: "advising Negroes of their constitu-
tional rights, urging them to institute litigation of a particular kind,
91. 371 U.S. at 434-35.
92. Compare Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479, 490, with id. at 490-91 (195).
93. Comment, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. I.
Rav. 67, 88 (1960).
94. 371 U.S. at 465.
95. 371 U.S. at 447 (opinion of White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. E.g., 371 U.S. at 428,444, and 371 U.S. at 442 ("the entire arrangement!).
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recommending particular lawyers and financing such litigation."' 7 And,
as the Court was to say later in the Brotherhood case, a British union's
program of retaining and paying counsel to represent members in
personal injury cases was "a practice similar to that we upheld in
NAACP v. Button... ." The first reading of Button is simply inade-
quate to this task.
Finally, most of the reasons which the Court gave for its decision were
reasons which justify holding litigation to be a protected activity. The
Court took a functional approach-matching the "purposes" of litiga-
tion against the "purposes" of the First Amendment, and upon find-
ing a correspondence, held the one to come within the scope of the
other. The Court seemed to focus upon two or perhaps three purposes
of free speech. First, in theory, only through a system of free com-
munication can a society arrive at the truth about any public issue.
Second, free speech is essential in a democratic society in order to
encourage members of the community to participate in the political
process. Third, free speech performs a legitimating function. People
who have been allowed to participate freely in a discussion will be more
willing to accept the ultimate decision.09
Protection of litigation fits within all of these First Amendment pur-
poses. For the society, litigation is one of the ways in which ideas
about public issues are expressed.
... [T]he litigation it [the NAACP] assists, while serving to vin-
dicate the legal rights of members of the American Negro commu-
nity, at the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possi-
ble the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas
and beliefs of our society.
100
Litigation was not always considered a benefit to society in this way. In
the common law's infancy, suits were looked upon essentially as fights
between private parties to be avoided whenever possible. The only
public interest was the interest in preventing physical violence in the
form of self-help. This attitude has changed, and partly because the
legal realists have made the now obvious point that every suit between
private parties affects the public in some way. This changing attitude
has manifested itself in some important changes in our legal system,
especially during the 1930's. For example, the Attorney General was
97. 371 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
98. 377 U.S. at 7.
99. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YA, L.J. 877,
881-893 (1963).
100. 871 U.S. at 431.
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given the power to intervene in certain private suits to protect the pub-
lic interest.10 1 And more important, administrative agencies were
created to represent the public in what previously had been thought of
as purely private, adversary proceedings. These changes represent a firm
commitment to the idea that litigation has public as well as private
importance.
This theory about litigation is most obviously correct in a case like
Button where the suits involved controversial national issues. However,
as some of the realists pointed out, private suits affect the public in all
cases, not just the big ones. In deciding a tort case, a court sets its course
in future torts cases. Every future tort claimant is affected, as is every
insurance company, and therefore every policyholder. As the circle gets
larger the effect diminishes, but the cumulative effect of the torts cases
on the public is great.
Litigation, then, may be a way for people to express positions on is-
sues of public importance regardless of the kind of suit involved. The
particular motivation of the party would seem to be equally irrelevant.
We do not know why NAACP members wanted to sue for desegregated
schools. Perhaps some did so simply as a matter of principle, and per-
haps others did so in order that their children would have the pecuniary
advantages of a better education. There is little doubt, though, that the
injured Brothers sued for money alone. And, in the Brotherhood case,
the Court protected these suits (and plaintiffs) as well as suits (and plain-
tiffs) motivated by political or moral principle, and with good reason.
Through their lawsuits these plaintiffs were taking a position on issues
which would affect the public. That fact is not altered because some
of the plaintiffs wanted to win money.
The second purpose of free speech also is furthered by declaring liti-
gation a protected First Amendment activity. Litigation is certainly an
effective (and sometimes the only effective) way for an individual to
participate in the political process. This statement was true for the
Negro litigants in Button. Their weak economic position insulated
much of the community from their claims. Their relatively weak
voting position insulated their federal and state representatives. Only
the courts remained open. Before the courts, the Negroes acted like an
economically or politically strong person would have acted before other
governmental agencies more sensitive to his claims.102 For the Negroes,
litigation was like lobbying.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1964).
102. Cf. Comment, 58 YAx L.J. 574 (1949).
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[I]t is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of
treatment by all government, federal, state, and local, for the mem-
bers of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of
political expression. Groups which find themselves unable to
achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the
courts. Just as it was true of the opponents of New Deal legislation
during the 1930's, for example, no less is it true of the Negro mi-
nority today. And under the conditions of modern government,
litigation may well be the sole practical avenue open to a minority
to petition for redress of grievances. 10 3
Although the Court talked about the particular problems of partici-
pation faced by Negroes, its argument here does not depend upon the
kind of litigation (or the kind of litigant) which may be involved. Liti-
gation need not be the only avenue open to an individual. It is enough
that it is one of the possible avenues. In the Brotherhood case the union
members were neither politically nor economically weak. Congress was
open to them, as was proven by their successful efforts to have the FELA
and the Safety Appliances Act passed. But the courts, too, were impor-
tant, and the Court kept that avenue open also.1 4
Finally, litigation performs the same legitimating function as speech,
and in a similar way. When a person feels that he can speak out on an
issue which concerns him, he is more likely to accept the decisions
his community makes. The mere possibility that he can be heard makes
any decision more legitimate. So, too, with courts and litigation. Pro-
fessor Black tells the story of the constitutional crisis in 1936, of how
millions of people opposed the New Deal partly because it was "usurpa-
tive and illegitimate as a matter of constitutional law,"'1 5 and of how
the Supreme Court met the crisis and quieted the people by upholding
the New Deal, by legitimating it. It is not that these people liked the
New Deal any better, or thought it any wiser, but at least it was legal. 100
On a much smaller scale, courts perform this legitimating function
all the time, the Supreme Court and constitutional issues completely
aside. Whenever a court decides a case, one party's action will be
"legitimated," and the other, presumably, will accept the action as legal,
if not wise. On this foundation a society of law is built. Without a neu-
tral and trusted arbiter there would be chaos. This is why people
must have free access to courts, and must be made to feel that they have
103. 371 U.S. at 429-30.
104. 377 US. at 2-4.
105. C. BL~cK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 62 (1960).
106. Id. at 56-65.
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access. If some people cannot test the legal claims of others, and if these
people cannot bring the state to their aid when they are in the right,
there is no reason why they should trust legal decisions, either in speci-
fic cases or in general, and there is no reason why they should view the
authority of any system of law in which they cannot participate as
"legitimate." At least in cumulative effect, then, this legitimating func-
tion is as important in small private suits as it is in constitutional lit-
gation. Indeed, if we heed the daily newspapers, it is the failure to
obtain a fair hearing on the most mundane kinds of claims (landlord-
tenant, welfare, consumer credit) which seems to call the system's legiti-
macy most seriously into question.
As an analytical tool, this functional method has its limitations since
many activities which are not, and could not be, protected have some
of the same purposes or functions as speech. However, the method
works reasonably well when it is applied to such a traditional way of
expressing oneself' 07-- through a lawyer and in court. In any event, re-
gardless of what justification is chosen, there is nothing particularly
radical about saying that litigation is a protected activity, that people
have the right to litigate. What follows, though, is radical, at least as it
affects the rules of legal ethics. For if people have the right to litigate,
then they may join together to help themselves or others exercise that
right, and the state cannot stop them by using the broad prophylactic
rules of legal ethics. If it is unclear that Button said these things, Broth-
erhood dispels the doubts.
A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the pro-
fessional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of in-
dividuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits au-
thorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest ....
The State can no more keep these workers from using their coop-
erative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct
means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their
legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so handi-
capped. 08
The effect of all this is summed up by Button's pithy sentence, "[A]
State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere
labels."' 9
107. Compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), with Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
108. 377 US. at 7.
109. 371 U.S. at 429.
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III. Conclusion
We have come full circle, back to the labels of legal ethics. At least
according to one court, these labels have lost their potency. Button and
Brotherhood do not mean, of course, that all rules of legal ethics are
invalid or that they may never be applied to group legal services. The
core right to litigate may be absolute, but the right to associate for this
purpose or to help others litigate need not be. Indeed, the state may
have a legitimate interest in making sure that these groups do not harm
the people whose rights are being implemented. The Court seemed to
say as much when it declared that Virginia had not demonstrated any
"'substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils" which
could justify prohibition of the NAACP legal program.110 A different
result might be required if "substantive evils" are shown. But these
evils must be real and particular, and the rules must be closely tailored
to the evil. "[Where] fundamental personal liberties are involved, they
may not be abridged by the states simply on a showing that a regulatory
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper
state purpose . . . .The law must be shown 'necessary and not merely
rationally related' to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy."
1'
The old justifications for the rules of legal ethics will no longer suf-
fice. The fact is that the Supreme Court has already shown its suspicion
of the "broad prophylactic rules"112 and has begun to require new justi-
fications for outlawing barratry, maintenance, and champerty, for pro-
hibiting people from stirring up litigation, for preventing lay inter-
mediaries, for the rules against solicitation.11 In essence, the Court is
asking that the rules focus on the actual harm to the client or to the
public. The reform in legal ethics, which had been only a matter of
sound policy and good sense, may now be a matter of constitutional
imperative.
March 14, 1967
110. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 444.
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (concurring opinion of Gold.
berg, J.).
112. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 438. The recent advisory opinion of the Florida Bar
Association's Committee on Professional Ethics, supra note 16, also shows some suspicion
of prophylactic rules, although the suspicion was not based on the Constitution. The Com-
mittee was aware that abuses might develop in the OEO's proposed program, but the
Committee was not willing to disapprove of the program before the abuses materialized.
113. 571 U.S. at 489-444.
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